Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes
  
 
 
 Working Paper No. 302  
 
Strictly Sincere Best Responses under Approval 
Voting and Arbitrary Preferences 
 
 
  Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Buckenmaier 
   
October 2018 
 
 
 
 
   
University of Zurich  Department of Economics 
   
Working Paper Series   ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online)   
   
 
 
 
Strictly Sincere Best Responses under Approval
Voting and Arbitrary Preferences∗
Carlos Alo´s-Ferrer†
University of Zurich
Johannes Buckenmaier‡
University of Zurich
This Version: August, 2018
Abstract
Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they
wish. One advantage of the method is that voters have weak or no incentives
to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends
on how the voters’ preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We
show that, under a combination of standard, well-established assumptions
on the extended preferences, voters will always have a strictly sincere best
response (that is, a best response ballot such that every approved candidate
is strictly preferred to every disapproved one) given the ballots of other
voters. The result holds for arbitrary preferences over candidates, allowing
for indifferences but covering the extreme cases of dichotomous or strict
preferences. As a corollary, we show that the classical strategy-proofness
result for the case of dichotomous preferences on alternatives (Brams and
Fishburn, 1978) holds for a larger class of preferences on sets than originally
assumed.
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1 Introduction
Approval voting is a voting method where voters are allowed to approve of as many
candidates as they wish. Since its introduction by Brams and Fishburn (1978), a
number of appealing properties of this method have been discussed. Among the
intuitive properties are that the support for vocal extremists is greatly reduced, as
shown e.g. in the field experiments of Laslier and Van der Straeten (2008) and Alo´s-
Ferrer and Granic´ (2012, 2015) (see also Baujard and Igersheim, 2010; Alo´s-Ferrer
and Granic´, 2010). Also, the method is less susceptible to polarize the electorate
and lead candidates to run “smear campaigns,” simply because candidates might
partly share their voter base. Among the more formal properties, Approval Voting
has been characterized as the only method aggregating multi-candidate ballots
which fulfills a number of appealing properties (Fishburn, 1978a,b; Alo´s-Ferrer,
2006). Last but most definitely not least, it has been argued that the Approval
Voting method is less vulnerable (or not at all) to voter manipulation (Brams and
Fishburn, 1978, 2005; Wolitzky, 2009).1
The intuition for this latter property is simple. Most reasons for strategic voter
behavior adopt a similar form. The voter would like to support candidate a, but
given the belief on the decisions of other voters, it is unlikely that candidate a will
win, and supporting that candidate comes at the cost of not being able to support
candidate b, which is not as good for the voter as a, but definitely better than
candidate c, who has clear chances of being elected. Hence, a vote for a becomes a
“wasted vote” and the voter is forced to misrepresent his or her preferences. The
wasted-vote effect creates a catch-22 where small parties remain small because
they are seen as small, and big traditional parties receive a large support simply
because they are seen as big. This effect might be easily seen to contribute to
creating a disconnect between the electorate’s true preferences and the elected
parties’ positions.
Approval Voting escapes the “wasted vote” effect. Even if the voter decides
to support b in order to avoid c, there is no reason not to support a, because
this latter decision comes at no cost. The voter can simply cast the ballot {a, b},
which is sincere. The “strategic” motive has simply caused the voter to select one
among several possible sincere votes, where sincerity is defined as preferring each
approved candidate to each disapproved one. A formalization of the idea, how-
1Because the voter’s non-strategic decision cannot be uniquely derived from preferences alone,
Approval Voting does not belong to the family of voting methods covered by the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem, which states that all methods (in that family) are manipulable (Gibbard,
1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
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ever, is not straightforward. The reason is that sincerity is a property of ballots,
which under Approval Voting are sets of candidates, and whether a sincere ballot
is selected or not is an assertion on whether it is preferred to other ballots. The
standard formal framework in social choice starts with preferences over candidates
(or alternatives). Hence, to evaluate whether one ballot is preferred to another,
one needs to extend those preferences to sets of candidates. However, given a
fixed preference relation among candidates, there are many different extensions
to sets of candidates. Depending on which properties are deemed reasonable for
such an extension, sincere ballots might be preferred to insincere ones or not. The
literature has examined many different properties of extended preferences, always
with the aim of identifying the extent of non-manipulability of Approval Voting.
For instance, Brams and Fishburn (1978) showed that Approval Voting is non-
manipulable under two conditions on the extended preferences (conditions (R)
and (P)), but their result was restricted to the class of dichotomous preferences.
Recently, Endriss (2013) identified a collection of conditions guaranteeing that a
voter will always have a sincere best response, given the ballots of other voters,
but the result was restricted to strict preferences over candidates (no indifferences
allowed). However, De Sinopoli et al. (2006) showed an example of a Nash equi-
librium in mixed strategies where one player has a unique best response which is
insincere, for a specific preference extension based on risk-neutral evaluation of
random tie-breaking if the set of winners contains more than one candidate.
In this work, we provide a simple formalization of the idea that Approval
Voting is resistant to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. We explicitly
allow for general preferences, including dichotomous ones as in Brams and Fishburn
(1978), strict preferences as in Endriss (2013), and the general case of non-strict
preferences.
Our result is based on three conditions, all of which are already present in the
literature. The first is condition (R) from Brams and Fishburn (1978), which, in
our view is a monotonicity property. We show that this condition is equivalent to
the following two properties: i) adding new options to a ballot which are better
than all alternatives already in the ballot produces at least a weak improvement;
ii) dropping some options from the ballot which were weakly worse than every
other alternative remaining in the ballot produces at least a weak improvement.
The other two properties were introduced by Endriss (2013) for the case of
strict preferences, and we consider their extensions to the general case. A prefer-
ence extension fulfills deletion if removing a candidate from a set yields a weak im-
provement whenever this set is strictly preferred to obtaining only that candidate
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alone. Further, a preference extension fulfills replacement if whenever some alter-
native is preferred to an alternative already in the set, then a weak improvement
over the latter set can be obtained by either exchanging those two elements, adding
the former to the set, or removing the latter from the set. Under monotonicity,
deletion, and replacement, we prove that every voter has a sincere best response
given the ballots of other voters. Even more, our result is actually stronger be-
cause what is proven is the existence of a strictly sincere best response, that is, one
where each approved candidate is strictly preferred to each disapproved candidate.
Interestingly, in the case of dichotomous preferences studied by Brams and
Fishburn (1978), condition (R) implies both deletion and replacement. It then
follows immediately from our result that, in this case, sincere voting is strategy
proof under Approval Voting for any preference extension to sets satisfying condi-
tion (R). Brams and Fishburn (1978) proved this result under two conditions, (R)
and (P). The latter is somewhat restrictive, being inspired by extensions where
sets of winners are evaluated in a risk-neutral way as if a final winner would be
selected at random. Our analysis implies that condition (P) is unnecessary for the
strategy-proofness result, an observation of obvious independent interest.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal framework
and the concepts of sincere and strictly sincere ballot. Section 3 introduces the
properties we focus on and related ones. Section 4 proves the main result. Section
5 reexamines the case of dichotomous preferences and shows that the classical
result of Brams and Fishburn (1978) holds with just one of their two assumptions.
Section 6 establishes the relations between our conditions and the ones previously
studied in the literature. Section 7 concludes.
2 Formal framework
The notation in this section essentially follows Alo´s-Ferrer (2006). LetX be a finite
set of at least two alternatives. A ballot is a subset of alternatives, B ⊆ X . Let
B = P(X) be the set of admissible ballots. Voters can cast any ballot, approving
of as many candidates as they want, but cannot reveal any preference among the
candidates they approve (or disapprove) of. The empty and the full ballot are
allowed, that is, voters can abstain. A ballot B is nontrivial if ∅ 6= B 6= X .
A voter response profile is a function pi : B 7→ N, with the interpretation that
pi(B) is the number of voters who cast ballot B. The number of participating
voters is
∑
B∈B pi(B). Let Π be the set of all possible voter response profiles
(implicitly, this allows for variable electorate size), including the empty profile pi∅
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such that pi∅(B) = 0 for all B ∈ B. Given x ∈ X and pi ∈ Π, denote v(x, pi) =
∑
{pi(B) | x ∈ B ∈ B}, i.e. the number of voters who approve of x in pi. Approval
Voting is a ballot aggregation function, that is, a correspondence f which assigns to
every possible voter response profile pi ∈ Π a nonempty set of selected alternatives,
∅  f(pi) ⊆ X . Specifically, it is the function which selects the maximizers of v(·, pi)
as winners,
fA(pi) = argmax
x∈X
∑
{pi(B) | x ∈ B ∈ B} .
Let A be the set of all possible preferences on X . Given a preference  ∈ A,
and following Brams and Fishburn (1978), a ballot B ∈ B is called sincere if,
whenever x ∈ B and y ≻ x, it follows that y ∈ B. We will deal with a more
stringent concept (and hence obtain a stronger result). We call a ballot B ∈ B
strictly sincere if x ≻ y for all x ∈ B and all y ∈ X \ B, where ≻ is the strict
preference associated to . Equivalently, B is strictly sincere if, whenever x ∈ B
and y  x, it follows that y ∈ B.
Two comments are in order. First, the empty and the full ballots are trivially
strictly sincere, but, since those capture abstention, it is interesting to ask when
nontrivial (strictly) sincere best responses exist, and hence there are incentives
for voter participation. For this purpose, we will distinguish between trivial and
nontrivial best responses. Second, if the preferences of a particular voter are strict,
that is, the voter is never indifferent among two different candidates, every sin-
cere ballot is strictly sincere (and, obviously, vice versa). For general preferences,
however, strict sincerity is a more stringent concept than sincerity.
Given a voter with preferences over candidates given by  ∈ A and a ballot
B ∈ B, let the upper set of B be given by
U(B) = {x ∈ X | x  b ∀b ∈ B } ,
that is, the set of all candidates that are viewed as (weakly) better than any and
all candidates in the ballot B. For notational convenience, let the indifference
class of an element a ∈ X be denoted by
I(a) = {x ∈ X | x ∼ a} .
Note that B ∩ U(B) is the set of maxima of  restricted to B, denoted by
max(B) or simply (if no confusion can arise) by maxB. Also, for any ballot B
and any preference , the set U(B) is always strictly sincere. For, if x ∈ U(B)
and y /∈ U(B), then if B 6= ∅ there exists z ∈ B such that x  z ≻ y, and hence
x ≻ y. If B = ∅, then U(B) = X , which is strictly sincere.
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Voters are endowed with individual preferences over alternatives i ∈ A. Since
Approval Voting delivers sets of winners, however, we need to consider preferences
over non-empty subsets of X , i.e. P(X) \ {∅}. To avoid unnecessarily complex
notation, we will use the same symbols (,≻) for the preference over sets and
the preference over alternatives. Since they apply to different formal objects, no
confusion should arise.
3 Conditions on preferences over sets
Consider a voter with preferences over candidates given by  ∈ A. In their seminal
article, Brams and Fishburn (1978, p.833) consider preference extensions based on
two assumptions.
(R) For any X1, X2, X3 ∈ B, if X1 ∪X2 6= ∅ 6= X2 ∪ X3 and x1 i x2, x2 i x3,
and x1 i x3 for all x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, and x3 ∈ X3, then X1∪X2  X2∪X3.
(P) For any x, y ∈ X , if x ≻i y, then {x} ≻ {x, y} ≻ {y}.
We first disentangle condition (R) in two separate properties for analytical
convenience. We say that a preference on sets of candidates  fulfills monotonicity
if the following two conditions hold.
(MN1) For all ballots A,B such that B 6= ∅ and A ⊆ U(B), it follows that
A ∪ B  B.
(MN2) For all ballots A,B such that B 6= ∅, A ⊆ B and ∅ 6= B \ A ⊆ U(A), it
follows that B \ A  B.
Condition (MN1) states that adding new options to a ballot B which are better
than all alternatives previously in the ballot produces at least a weak improvement.
That is, adding new candidates to a set always produces a weakly better set
provided all added candidates are weakly preferred to all previous ones. Condition
(MN2) states that dropping some options from the ballot B which were weakly
worse than every other alternative remaining in the ballot produces at least a weak
improvement. That is, dropping candidates from a set always produces a weakly
better set provided all dropped candidates are weakly worse than all non-dropped
ones.
It turns out that monotonicity is fully equivalent to condition (R). In the sequel,
we will refer to it by the latter name since it is well-known in the literature, but
rely on properties (MN1) and (MN2).
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Lemma 1. A preference relation on B fulfills monotonicity if and only if it fulfills
condition (R).
Proof. To see that monotonicity implies (R), let X1, X2, X3 be as assumed in (R).
First, suppose X2 = ∅. Thus, X1, X3 6= ∅. By hypothesis X1 ⊆ U(X3), hence
applying (MN1) to X1 and X3 yields X1∪X3  X3 and applying (MN2) to X3 and
X1∪X3 yields X1 = (X1∪X3)\X3  X1∪X3. By transitivity it follows X1  X3.
Next, suppose X2 6= ∅. By hypothesis X2 ⊆ U(X3) and applying (MN2) to X3
and X2 ∪ X3 yields X2  X2 ∪ X3. Further, X1 ⊆ U(X2) by hypothesis and
applying (MN1) to X1 and X2 we obtain X1 ∪X2  X2. By transitivity it follows
X1 ∪X2  X2 ∪X3. Hence (R) holds.
To see that (R) implies monotonicity, let A,B ∈ B with B 6= ∅. If A ⊆ U(B),
applying (R) to X1 = A, X2 = B, and X3 = ∅ yields A ∪ B  B, proving (MN1).
If A ⊆ B and ∅ 6= B \ A ⊆ U(A), applying (R) to X1 = ∅, X2 = B \ A, and
X3 = A ∩ B yields B \ A  B, proving (MN2).
The next property is the deletion axiom by Endriss (2013), which states that
if a set is strictly preferred to some singleton set, then this element can be safely
deleted from the set without reducing its attractiveness. In other words, if an
element of a set is strictly worse than the set itself, then dropping that element
from the set produces at least a weak improvement.
(DEL) For all nonempty ballots A and all a ∈ A such that A ≻ {a}, it follows
that A \ {a}  A.
Finally, we will require the following replacement axiom, which is a slightly
stronger version of the weak replacement axiom introduced by Endriss (2013).2
The strengthening is needed to deal with the case of indifferences and was hence
not required in Endriss (2013) (which considered strict preferences only).
(RP) For every non-empty ballot A and for all a ∈ A, one of the following holds.
(RP.1) A \ {a}  A and A 6= {a}.
(RP.2) A ∪B  A for each b ∈ X with b  a and B ⊆ I(b).
(RP.3) (A \ {a}) ∪ B  A for each b ∈ X with b ≻ a and B ⊆ I(b), and also
A ∪B  A for each B ⊆ I(a).
2This axiom in Endriss (2013) is itself a weaker version of the replacement axiom by Puppe
(1995) stating that (A \ {a}) ∪ {b}  A if b ≻ a for a ∈ A and b /∈ A.
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Essentially, condition (RP) requires that if some element b is preferred to an
element a ∈ A, then the set A can be weakly improved by either exchanging a by
(a subset of the indifference class of) b, adding (a subset of the indifference class
of) b to the set, or removing a from the set. Further, in case b is indifferent to a it
requires that already one of the latter two actions results in a weak improvement.
The condition reduces exactly to the replacement axiom of Endriss (2013) if one
restricts the analysis to the domain of strict preferences, but allows to deal with
the general case with a minimum amount of added complexity.
To put our conditions in context, we also consider a stronger but natural one.
We say that a preference on sets of candidates  fulfills subset improvement, (SIM),
if the following holds.
(SIM) For all nonempty ballots A,B such that A\B ⊆ U(B) and A∩U(B) 6= ∅,
it follows that A  B.
In words, (SIM) states that if a set of candidates is added to a subset of a
ballot B, all of which are weakly preferred to all candidates in the full ballot, then
the new ballot A is necessarily seen as at least weakly better than the previous
one, B. To put it differently, if a set A consists of alternatives that were already
in B and at least some alternative which is better than all alternatives in B, then
A must be seen as better than B.3
The next result shows that subset improvement implies all previously-stated
conditions except for condition (P).
Lemma 2. Given a preference on candidates, if a preference on sets of candidates
fulfills (SIM), then it also fulfills condition (R), deletion, and replacement.
Proof. Let B be a nonempty ballot.
(MN1). Let A ⊆ U(B). If A = ∅, then A ∪ B  B holds trivially. If A 6= ∅,
let C = A ∪ B. Then C \ B = A ⊆ U(B) and C ∩ U(B) ⊇ A 6= ∅. Applying
(SIM) to C and B, it follows that A ∪B = C  B.
(MN2). Let A ⊆ B be such that ∅ 6= B \ A ⊆ U(A). Let C = B \ A 6= ∅.
Then C \ B = ∅ ⊆ U(B). By hypothesis, for every z ∈ C = B \ A it follows
that z  a for all a ∈ A. Hence C ∩ U(B) 6= ∅, else we would have a ≻ z for
all z ∈ B \ A and some a ∈ A, a contradiction. Applying (SIM) to C and B, it
follows that B \ A = C  B.
(DEL). Let b ∈ B such that B ≻ {b}. Set A = B \{b}. If A∩U(B) 6= ∅, then
applying (SIM) to A and B, it follows A = B \ {b}  B. If A ∩ U(B) = ∅, then
3A possible criticism of (SIM) is that the voter then must be indifferent among all sets of
mutually indifferent alternatives. This criticism is void if preferences are strict.
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max(B) = {b} and applying (SIM) to {b} and B yields {b}  B, a contradiction.
Hence, (DEL) holds.
(RP). Let A 6= ∅ and a ∈ A. If a /∈ U(A), then (A \ {a}) ∩ U(A) 6= ∅
and (A \ {a}) \ A = ∅ ⊆ U(A). It follows by (SIM) that A \ {a}  A, showing
that (RP.1) holds. If a ∈ U(A), let b ∈ X with b  a and B ⊆ I(b). Then
(B ∪ A) \ A = B ⊆ U(A) and (A ∪ B) ∩ U(A) 6= ∅ since a ∈ (A ∪ B) ∩ U(A).
Applying (SIM) to A∪B and A yields A∪B ⊆ A, hence (RP.2) holds. Hence we
have either (RP.1) or (RP.2) and (RP) holds.
Condition (SIM) is stronger than (R) because it requires A  B to hold even
if the new candidates (preferred to every single member of B) are added to a
strict subset of B, where some candidates have been dropped. Property (SIM),
however, does not imply (P), because the latter states strict indifference. Concep-
tually, however, (SIM) represents a (slightly) more restrictive condition than the
conjunction of (P) and (R) used in Brams and Fishburn (1978).
Given a preference over candidates, a preference over sets of candidates is called
an extension, respectively a weak extension of the former if property (EXT) below,
respectively (WXT), holds.
(EXT) For all a, b ∈ X such that a ≻ b, it follows {a} ≻ {b}.
(WXT) For all a, b ∈ X such that a  b, it follows {a}  {b}.
Monotonicity and subset improvement are just consistency conditions between
a given preference over candidates and a given preference over sets. A priori, they
do not require the latter to be an extension of the former. However, it turns out
that both of them actually imply (WXT).
Lemma 3. Given a preference on candidates, if a preference on sets of candi-
dates fulfills condition (R), then it also fulfills (WXT). Hence, (SIM) also implies
(WXT).
Proof. Let a, b ∈ X such that a  b. If a = b, there is nothing to prove. Hence,
suppose a 6= b. First we apply (MN1) to the nonempty ballots {a} and {b}. Since
{a} ⊆ U({b}), (MN1) implies {a, b}  {b}. Second we apply (MN2) to the
nonempty ballots {b} and {a, b}. Since {b} ⊆ {a, b} and {a, b} \ {b} = {a} ⊆
U({b}), (MN2) implies that {a} = {a, b} \ {b}  {a, b}. Putting both properties
together, we obtain {a}  {a, b}  {b} and the conclusion follows from transitivity.
That (SIM) also implies (WXT) follows from Lemma 2.
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In contrast, it is easy to see that neither condition (R) together with deletion
and replacement nor subset improvement imply (EXT), since the latter is stated
in terms of strict preference. In order to work with extensions as captured by this
more stringent condition, (EXT) needs to be assumed separately. However, this
condition is not required for our main result.
Section 6 below discusses the relation of condition (R), replacement, and subset
improvement to conditions previously discussed in the literature.
4 Existence of strictly sincere best responses
Let I be a finite set of voters, each of them endowed with preferences over candi-
dates i. We do not assume those preferences to be strict, that is, voters might
be indifferent among some candidates. We denote the ballot cast by voter i by
Bi. Following the standard game-theoretic convention, denote by B−i the vector of
ballots cast by voters other than i. Then, fA(Bi, B−i) represents the corresponding
outcome of Approval Voting.
Theorem 1. Let voter i have arbitrary preferences over candidates and preferences
over sets fulfilling condition (R), deletion, and replacement. Let B−i be an arbitrary
vector of ballots for the other voters.
(a) There exists a strictly sincere ballot for i which is a best response to B−i.
(b) If voter i’s preferences over candidates are nontrivial, then there exists a non-
trivial, strictly sincere ballot for i which is a best response to B−i.
Proof. We require some preliminary notation and concepts. Let B be an arbitrary
ballot for i and B−i the vector of ballots cast by voters other than i. Let K be the
highest number of votes received by a candidate under B−i (excluding the approvals
of i). The set of pivotal candidates, denoted by P , is the set of candidates that
received exactly K votes under B−i. The set of subpivotal candidates, denoted by
S, is the set of candidates that received exactly K − 1 votes under B−i.
Note that for every C ∈ B under (C,B−i) an alternative can receive at most
K + 1 approval votes and alternatives in P receive at least K approval votes.
Hence, for any C ∈ B the set of winners WC = fA(C,B−i) is a subset of P ∪ S.
More precisely, WC is either a subset of pivotal candidates or it is the union of all
pivotal candidates and a subset of subpivotal candidates.
For B ∈ B we denote the set of approved candidates that are weakly dominated
by some non-approved candidate by ι(B) = {b ∈ B | ∃c ∈ X \B s.t. c i b}. We
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will make use of the following relation among ballots, which allows us to order
ballots by their “degree of sincerity” (Endriss, 2013). Specifically, given B,B′ ∈ B,
we say that B is strictly more sincere than B′ if and only if either B is strictly
sincere and B′ is not, or both are not strictly sincere and one of the following
conditions holds:
(S1) b ≻ b′ for all b ∈ max(X \B′), b′ ∈ max(X \B)
(S2) b ∼ b′ for all b ∈ max(X \B′), b′ ∈ max(X \B) and |ι(B)| < |ι(B′)|
The interpretation is as follows: A ballot becomes strictly more sincere if the
top non-approved alternatives become less preferred ones, or if the number of ap-
proved alternatives that are dominated by some non-approved alternative becomes
smaller while the top non-approved alternatives remain equally preferred.
We first establish the following useful fact.
Claim. If b ∈ ι(B), then B \ {b} is strictly more sincere than B.
To see the claim, just note that X \ (B \ {b}) = X \B ∪ {b}. The indifference
condition in (S2) follows from this equality and the fact that b ∈ ι(B). The
remainder of (S2) follows because ι (B \ {b}) ⊆ ι(B) and b /∈ ι (B \ {b}).
We now turn to the proof of part (a). Let B be a ballot for i that is not strictly
sincere, and let W = fA(B,B−i) be the set of winners under Approval Voting if
ballots B and B−i are cast. We have to show that there always exists a strictly
sincere ballot such that i weakly prefers the outcome under that ballot toW . As a
first step, we show that such a ballot always exists if there is a nonempty subset of
pivotal candidates that is weakly preferred to W . Second, when no such set exists
we describe an iterative procedure that allows us to construct a strictly sincere
ballot that is (weakly) preferred. Thus, we distinguish the following two cases.
Case 1. There exists a nonempty subset of pivotal candidates P ′ ⊆ P such that
P ′  W .
Assume such a set P ′ exists. Note that it follows from (R) that max(P ) 
max(P ′)  P ′ as P ′ ⊆ P . Thus max(P )  P ′  W , that is, i weakly prefers
max(P ) to W . Casting the strictly sincere ballot B∗ = U(max(P )) yields the
outcome WB
∗
= max(P ), which is a weak improvement for i. Hence in this case
there exists a strictly sincere ballot that yields an outcome which i weakly prefers
to W .
Case 2. W is strictly preferred to all nonempty subsets of pivotal candidates, that
is, W ≻ P ′ for all P ′ ⊆ P .
11
In this case B cannot involve approving of any pivotal candidate. To see this,
note that B ∩ P 6= ∅ implies W ⊆ P , a contradiction since by assumption W
is strictly preferred to all subsets of pivotal candidates. Thus, B ∩ P = ∅ and
the set of winners contains all pivotal candidates, i.e. P ⊆ W , and possibly some
subpivotal candidates. Hence, we can write W = P ∪S ′ for some S ′ ⊆ S ∩B with
S ′ non-empty, since S ′ = ∅ would implies W = P , a contradiction since W ≻ P .
Since B is not strictly sincere, we have ι(B) 6= ∅. We distinguish three subcases.
Case 2.1. max(X \B) ∩ (P ∪ S) = ∅
In this case, no element of max(X \B) is pivotal or subpivotal. We can simply
add all elements of max(X \ B) to the ballot to obtain a new ballot B∗ = B ∪
max(X \ B). This new ballot is strictly more sincere than B by (S1), while the
set of winners remains unchanged, WB
∗
= W .
Case 2.2. max(X \B) ∩ P 6= ∅
In this case, one of the top non-approved alternatives is pivotal. Let b ∈ ι(B).
The ballot B∗ = B\{b} is strictly more sincere than B by the claim above. The set
of winners is WB
∗
=W \ {b}. It remains to show that this set is weakly preferred
to W by i.
• If b /∈ W , then the outcome is not affected, that is, WB
∗
=W .
• If b ∈ W , then the outcome is WB
∗
=W \ {b}. Let c ∈ max(X \B)∩P . By
assumption (Case 2) we must have W ≻ {c}. Since {c}  {b} by (WXT)
(which is implied by condition (R) by Lemma 3), it follows that W ≻ {b}
by transitivity. Applying (DEL) we obtain W \ {b} W as desired.
Case 2.3. max(X \B) ⊆ S
Finally, we consider the case where all elements of max(X \B) are subpivotal.
First, suppose ι(B) ∩ S = ∅. In this case, we can just remove all elements in ι(B)
from the ballot (recall that also B∩P = ∅) and set B∗ = B \ ι(B), which does not
affect the set of winners. Since ι(B∗) = ∅, it follows that B∗ is a strictly sincere
ballot.
Second, suppose ι(B) ∩ S 6= ∅. Let b ∈ max(ι(B) ∩ S). By (RP) one of the
following three cases holds.
• W \ {b}  W and W 6= {b}. Then, the ballot B∗ = B \ {b}, which is
strictly more sincere than B by the claim above, yields the set of winners
WB
∗
=W \ {b} W .
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• W ∪ D  W for each c ∈ X with c  b and D ⊆ I(c). In this case, let
c ∈ max(X \ B) and note that max(X \ B) ⊆ I(c) and c  b. Then, the
ballot B∗ = B ∪ max(X \ B) delivers WB
∗
= W ∪ max(X \ B)  W as
the set of winners. It remains to show that B∗ is strictly more sincere than
B. Let b′ ∈ max(X \ B∗) and b∗ ∈ max(X \ B). Since X \ B∗ ⊆ X \ B,
it follows that b∗  b′. If b∗ ∼ b′, then b′ ∈ max(X \ B), contradicting
b′ ∈ X \ B∗ = X \ (B ∪ max(X \ B)). Thus we must have b∗ ≻ b′. This
shows that B∗ is strictly more sincere than B by (S1).
• (W \ {b}) ∪ D  W for each c ∈ X with c ≻ b and D ⊆ I(c), and also
W ∪D W for each D ⊆ I(b). First, suppose there is c ∈ max(X \B) with
c ≻ b and note that max(X \ B) ⊆ I(c). Then setting B
∗ = (B \ {b}) ∪
max(X \ B) delivers the set of winners WB
∗
= (W \ {b}) ∪ max(X \ B),
which is weakly preferred to W by hypothesis. To see that B∗ is strictly
more sincere than B, let b′ ∈ max(X \ B∗) and b∗ ∈ max(X \ B). We
have X \ B∗ = (X \ (B ∪ max(X \ B))) ∪ {b}, hence either b′ = b or b′ ∈
max(X\(B∪max(X\B)). If b′ = b, then since max(X\B) ⊆ I(c) and c ≻ b,
it follows that b∗ ≻ b′. On the other hand, if b′ ∈ max(X \(B∪max(X \B))),
then since X \ (B ∪max(X \B)) ⊆ X \B and b′ /∈ max(X \B) , it follows
that b∗ ≻ b′ as well. Thus B∗ is strictly more sincere than B by (S1).
Now, suppose that c ∼ b for all c ∈ max(X \B). In this case, we must have
max(X \B) ⊆ I(b) and thus W ∪max(X \B)  W by hypothesis. Setting
B∗ = B∪max(X \B) yields the set of winners W ∗ =W ∪max(X \B) W .
To see that B∗ is strictly more sincere than B, let b′ ∈ max(X \ B∗) and
b∗ ∈ max(X \B). Since X \B∗ ⊆ X \B and max(X \B)∩ (X \B∗) = ∅, it
follows that b∗ ≻ b′. Hence, B∗ is strictly more sincere than B by (S1).
Thus, we have proven that, for any given ballot B, there is a strictly more
sincere ballot B∗ such that the associated outcome WB
∗
= fA(B∗, B−i) is weakly
preferred to W by i. In particular, for all nonempty subsets of pivotal candidates
P ′ ⊆ P it holds that WB
∗
 W ≻ P , hence B∗ and WB
∗
fall into Case 2 as well.
This allows us to iterate the argument, and because the set of alternatives X is
finite we obtain a strictly sincere ballot that is a weak improvement over W after
a finite number of steps.
To complete the proof of (a), choose a best response to B−i under the preference
over sets of candidates, which exists since the number of ballots is finite. If that
best response is not strictly sincere, by the argument above there exists a weak
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improvement in the form of a strictly sincere ballot, which is necessarily also a
best response.
It remains to show part (b). In the proof of (a), note that whenever B∗ 6= X ,
the ballot B∗ is a nontrivial, strictly sincere ballot. The proof of (b) will be
complete if we can show that it is also possible to improve upon B by switching
to a nontrivial, strictly sincere ballot in the extreme case where B∗ = X , which is
then strictly sincere but trivial.
Suppose B∗ = X . Clearly P 6= ∅ and it follows that P ∩ B∗ = P 6= ∅.
Hence, the set of winners WB
∗
is given by P . Consider the strictly sincere ballot
Bˆ = U(max(P )) with associated set of winners max(P )  P = W
B∗ . Note
that Bˆ 6= B∗ unless P = X and all alternatives in P are indifferent for i, which
is impossible since i’s preferences over candidates are nontrivial. Hence Bˆ is a
nontrivial, strictly sincere ballot with set of winners W Bˆ WB
∗
.
Theorem 1 provides a simple formalization of the intuition that Approval Vot-
ing favors sincerity. Specifically, independently of what the beliefs of a voter might
be, the set of best replies under Approval Voting always contains a (strictly) sin-
cere ballot. This property holds in the general case where voters are endowed with
preferences which are not necessarily strict. Of course, this result does not guar-
antee that sincere ballot-casting is a Nash equilibrium, since voters might have
multiple sincere ballots. Still, it shows that, under Approval Voting, voters never
have a strict incentive to deviate to insincere ballots.
5 The case of dichotomous preferences
Brams and Fishburn (1978) studied preference extensions based on conditions (P)
and (R). They considered the extreme case of dichotomous preferences, where each
voter has exactly two indifference classes. This is a natural benchmark for Ap-
proval Voting because, for each voter, candidates are naturally partitioned into two
classes, along the intended lines of approval and disapproval. For this case, condi-
tion (R) implies deletion and replacement, and hence the latter two are redundant
for Theorem 1.
Lemma 4. If preferences are dichotomous, condition (R) implies deletion and
replacement.
Proof. Let  be dichotomous on X . Then, there exist XH , XL ⊆ X with XH ∩
XL = ∅ and XH ∪XL = X such that x ≻ y for each x ∈ XH , y ∈ XL, x ∼ x
′ for
all x, x′ ∈ XH , and y ∼ y
′ for all y, y′ ∈ XL.
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Consider deletion first. Let ∅ 6= A ∈ B and a ∈ X such that A ≻ {a}. It
follows that a ∈ XL. To see this, suppose a ∈ XH . Taking X1 = {a}, X2 = ∅,
and X3 = A in (R) implies {a}  A, in contradiction to A ≻ {a}. Hence a ∈ XL.
Let now X1 = ∅, X2 = A \ {a}, and X3 = {a}, and note that X2 6= ∅ because
A ≻ {a}. Applying (R) again yields A \ {a}  {a}, hence deletion holds.
To see replacement, let a ∈ A ∈ B. First, suppose a ∈ XL. If A 6= {a},
applying (R) to X1 = ∅, X2 = A \ {a}, and X3 = {a} yields A \ {a}  {A} and
(RP.1) holds. If A = {a}, then for b ∈ X with b  a and D ⊆ I(b) applying (R)
to X1 = D, X2 = A, and X3 = ∅ yields A∪D  A, showing (RP.2). Next, suppose
a ∈ XH . Let b ∈ X with b ⊆ a and D ⊆ I⊆(b). It follows a ∼ b and D ⊆ XH .
Applying (R) to X1 = D, X2 = A, and X3 = ∅ yields A∪D  A, showing (RP.2).
Hence, we have either (RP.1) or (RP.2), completing the proof of replacement.
Under dichotomous preferences there are in general many sincere ballots, since
a voter can approve of all his “better” candidates and part of the “worse” ones
without violating sincerity. In contrast, under dichotomous preferences each voter
has exactly one strictly sincere ballot, which coincides with his or her upper in-
difference class. Brams and Fishburn (1978, Corollary 1) show that this is the
only strategy that is not weakly dominated. It follows from Theorem 1 that this
sincere ballot is a best response against any constellation of ballots of other voters.
By Lemma 4, this holds under just condition (R). We obtain a simple version of
Brams and Fishburn (1978) strategy-proofness result.
Corollary 1. If all voters have dichotomous preferences over candidates and pref-
erences over sets fulfilling condition (R), casting the (unique) strictly sincere ballots
constitutes a Nash Equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies.
Brams and Fishburn (1978) established this result under conditions (R) and
(P). Our Corollary implies that condition (P) was not necessary.
6 Relation to other properties and results
6.1 Cardinal utilities and random tie-breaking
Consider voters with preferences that are based on utility functions. Assuming
that ties among sets of winners are broken uniformly, the expected utility of a
set of alternatives is well-defined. Assuming voters maximize expected utility
preferences over sets of alternatives are naturally defined. The next result shows
that this classical example of a preference extension to sets satisfies condition (R),
deletion, and replacement.
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Proposition 1. Consider a voter who is an expected-utility maximizer expecting
uniform tie-breaking. Then the voter’s preferences over sets of alternatives satisfy
condition (R), deletion, and replacement.
Proof. Let  be the set preferences of a voter who is an expected-utility maximizer
expecting uniform tie-breaking. Let u : X −→ R+ be the voters utility function.
We denote the expected utility of a set A ⊆ X by u(A) =
∑
a∈A
1
|A|
u(a).
Consider monotonicity first. Let A,B ∈ B with B 6= ∅ and A ⊆ U(B). It
follows, u(a) ≥ u(b) for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B and hence u(A) ≥ u(B). Further,
u(A ∪ B) = |A|u(A)+|B|u(B)
|A|+|B|
≥ |A|u(B)+|B|u(B)
|A|+|B|
= u(B), that is, A ∪ B ⊆ B and
(MN1) holds. To see (MN2), let A ⊆ B and ∅ 6= B \ A ⊆ U(A). It follows
u(B\A) ≥ u(A) Thus u(B) = |B\A|u(B\A)+|A|u(A)
|B\A|+|A|
≤ |B\A|u(B\A)+|A|u(B\A)
|B\A|+|A|
= u(B\A),
that is, B \ A  B and (MN2) holds.
Next, we show deletion. Let a ∈ A such that A ≻ {a}. This is only possible if
a yields below average utility among the alternatives in A. It follows that average
utility can only increase, when a is removed from A, that is, A \ {a}  A. Hence,
(DEL) holds.
We now turn to (RP). Let A 6= ∅ and a ∈ A. If u(a) ≤ u(A), then u(A \
{a}) ≥ u(A) and it follows that A \ {a}  A, that is, (RP.1) holds. Now suppose
u(a) > u(A) and let D ⊆ I(b) for some b  a (if no such element exists, then
(RP.2) holds trivially). It follows, u(b′) ≥ u(a) > u(A) for all b′ ∈ D. Thus,
D\A 6= ∅ and u(D\A) > u(A). It follows that u(A∪D) = |A|u(A)
|A|+|D\A|
+ |D\A|u(D\A)
|A|+|D\A|
>
|A|u(A)
|A|+|D\A|
+ |D\A|u(A)
|A|+|D\A|
= u(A), which shows A ∪D  A. Hence, (RP.2) holds in this
case. Taken together, this shows that (RP) holds.
As a consequence, we obtain that under Approval Voting with uniform tie-
breaking, upon learning the ballots of the other voters, a voter who is an expected-
utility maximizer will always have a best response that is strictly sincere. We have
just shown that the (not necessarily strict) preferences of such a voter satisfy
condition (R), deletion, and replacement, which allows us to apply Theorem 1.
In the following example, we show that the preferences of such a voter do not in
general satisfy the stronger condition (SIM).
Remark 1. The preferences over sets of a voter maximizing expected utility assum-
ing that ties are broken at random (uniformly) do not satisfy (SIM). To see this,
let X = {x, y, z, t} and consider a voter with utility function given by u(x) = 7,
u(y) = u(z) = 6, and u(t) = 0. Under (SIM), the set A = {x, t} should be at least
weakly preferred to A′ = {y, z, t}. However, random tie-breaking and expected
utility yield U(A) = 1
2
7 + 1
2
0 = 3.5 < 4 = 2
3
6 + 1
3
0 = U(A′).
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6.2 Relation to the Ga¨rdenfors Principle
The following pair of properties first appeared in Ga¨rdenfors (1976) and are jointly
referred to as the Ga¨rdenfors Principle (GAR).4
(GF1) A ∪ {b} ≻ A if b ≻ a for all a ∈ A.
(GF2) A ≻ A ∪ {b} if a ≻ b for all a ∈ A.
We note that although they capture a similar concept as condition (R), (GAR)
and (R) are independent in the sense that none implies the other.
Remark 2. Condition (R) implies neither (GF1) nor (GF2). Let X = {a, b} with
a ≻ b. First, consider the preference over sets given by {a} ≻ {a, b} ∼ {b}. It
is easy to see that these satisfy (R), but violate (GF1). Second, assume that
preferences over sets are given by {a} ∼ {a, b} ≻ {b}. Again (R) is satisfied, but
(GF2) does not hold.
Remark 3. (GAR) does not imply condition (R). Let X = {a, b, c} with a ≻ b ∼ c.
Consider the following preferences over sets: {a} ≻ {a, b} ∼ {a, c} ≻ {a, b, c} ≻
{b} ∼ {c} ≻ {b, c}. Those satisfy (GAR), but not condition (R). To see this,
note that (MN1) would imply that adding b to {c} results at least in a weak
improvement, that is, {b, c}  {c}, a contradiction.
6.3 Endriss’ conditions and the case of strict preferences
Endriss (2013) considers the case of strict preferences only, that is, voters are not
allowed to be indifferent among any two candidates. In this case, given preferences
≻ and any nonempty set of candidates A, the best and worst candidates in A
according to ≻ are always unique and well-defined (because the set of candidates
is finite). Slightly abusing notation, we denote them by max(A) and min(A),
respectively. Endriss (2013) studies a number of properties, some of which are
weaker than our conditions, and some of which are stronger.
Consider the following properties.
(MAX) {max(A)}  A.
(MIN) A  {min(A)}.
(WRP) (A\{a})∪{b}  A or A∪{b}  A or A 6= {a} and A\{a}  A if b ≻ a.
4To economize notation, all properties from this point on are understood to be stated for all
ballots and all elements as appropriate.
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Property (MAX) states that getting only the best element of a set is at least as
good as the whole set. Similarly, (MIN) requires that a set is at least as good as
the singleton set containing only its worst element. (WRP) is a weak version of the
replacement axiom of Puppe (1995), which characterized a proposal of Sen (1991).
Intuitively, it requires for any pair of strictly ranked alternatives that at least one
of the following operations weakly improves any given set of alternatives: replacing
the worse alternative of the two (given it is in the set) by the better alternative,
adding the better alternative to the set, or removing the worse alternative from
the set.
The following theorem is the main result of Endriss (2013).
Theorem 2 (Endriss, 2013). Assume the preferences of a voter are strict and
satisfy (EXT), (MAX), (MIN), (WRP), and (DEL). Then, given the ballots of
other voters, a voter will always have a sincere best response.
As mentioned above, (EXT) is not implied by (SIM) as it states strict prefer-
ence. However, (SIM) implies all the other properties required for Theorem 2. We
first show that already the weaker condition (R) implies (MAX) and (MIN), and
as a consequence so does (SIM).
Proposition 2. Assume strict preferences. Then, condition (R) implies (MAX)
and (MIN).
Proof. Let  be a preference over sets satisfying condition (R).
(MAX). Let B ∈ B and set A = B \ {max(B)} ⊆ B. It follows, B \ A =
{max(B)} ⊆ U≻(A) and B\A 6= ∅, applying (MN2) to A and B yields {max(B)} =
B \ A  B. Hence, (MAX) holds.
(MIN). Let B ∈ B and set A = B \ {min(B)}. It follows, A ⊆ U({min(B)})
and B = {min(B)} ∪A. Applying (MN1) to {max(B)} and A yields {min(B)} ∪
A  {min(B)}. Hence, B  {min(B)} and (MIN) holds.
In Lemma 2 we have shown that (SIM) implies condition (R), (DEL), and
(RP). Clearly, (RP) implies (WRP), that is, the replacement axiom used in our
main result is stronger than (WRP). However, for the case of strict preferences
(RP) reduces to (WRP). Further, (SIM) also implies (WRP) and we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 3. Assume strict preferences. Then, (SIM) implies (MAX), (MIN),
(WRP), and (DEL).
However, (WRP), and thus (RP), is not implied by condition (R) as the fol-
lowing remark shows.
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Remark 4. Condition (R) does not imply (WRP). For example, let X = {a, b, c, d}
with a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d and consider the following preferences over sets  given by
{a} ≻ {a, b} ≻ {a, b, c} ≻ {a, c} ≻ {a, c, d} ≻ {a, b, d} ≻ {a, d} ≻ {a, b, c, d} ≻
{b} ≻ {b, c} ≻ {b, d} ≻ {b, c, d} ≻ {c} ≻ {c, d} ≻ {d}. For these preferences it can
be verified that condition (R) holds, but (WRP) is not satisfied for A = {a, c, d}
and b ≻ c since {a, c, d} ≻ A ∪ {b} = X , {a, c, d} ≻ A \ {c} = {a, d}, and
{a, c, d} ≻ A \ {c} ∪ {b} = {a, b, d}.
By the last proposition, it follows that if a preference over sets of candidates
satisfies (EXT) and (SIM), Theorem 2 applies and sincere best responses exist.
For the particular case of strict preferences, sincerity and strict sincerity coincide,
and hence, for this case, Theorem 2 would imply Theorem 1 if condition (EXT)
were added to the latter’s hypotheses. On the other hand, Theorem 1 is stronger
than Theorem 2 because, first, it applies to the general case where preferences are
not necessarily strict; second, it proves strict sincerity rather than just sincerity
even when those concepts differ; and third, it does not require condition (EXT).
Remark 5. The combination of hypotheses in Theorem 2, that is, (EXT), (MAX),
(MIN), (WRP), and (DEL), does not imply (SIM). For example, consider the
preferences of a voter endowed with a utility function who evaluates sets as if ties
are broken uniformly at random. It is clear that (EXT) is satisfied (for details
see Endriss, 2013, proof of Theorem 9). By Proposition 1 such preferences satisfy
condition (R), deletion and replacement, hence (MAX), (MIN), and (WRP) hold
as well. In particular, (EXT), (MAX), (MIN), (WRP), and (DEL) hold as well for
the example in Remark 1 where we have already seen that (SIM) does not hold.
However, it can be shown that, in the case of strict preferences, (EXT), (MAX),
and (MIN), together with the extreme “optimism” assumption that A ∼ {max(A)}
(Taylor, 2005), do imply (SIM). An analogous result applies for the “pessimism”
assumption that A ∼ {min(A)}. Although the proof is not immediate, it can
also be shown that property (SIM) is also implied (for strict preferences) by the
combination of (GAR) and property (MMX) introduced by Kannai and Peleg
(1984), i.e. A ∼ {max(A),min(A)}.
7 Conclusion
We have established a non-manipulability result for Approval Voting which applies
to arbitrary preferences (encompassing the particular cases of strict and dichoto-
mous preferences) and provides a formalization for the intuitive idea that voters
lack incentives to misrepresent their preferences under Approval Voting. We have
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provided a set of consistency conditions for an extension of a voter’s preference
over candidates to sets of candidates that, if fulfilled, guarantee that a voter will
always have a strictly sincere best response given the ballots of the other voters.
Our result is stronger than previous ones because, first, it holds for arbitrary, not
necessarily strict preferences over candidates, and, second, we use a more strin-
gent concept of sincerity that requires that every approved candidate is strictly
preferred to every disapproved one.
References
Alo´s-Ferrer, C. (2006). A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting. Social
Choice and Welfare, 27(3):621–625.
Alo´s-Ferrer, C. and Granic´, D.-G. (2010). Approval Voting in Germany: De-
scription of a Field Experiment. In Laslier, J.-F. and Sanver, M. R., editors,
Handbook on Approval Voting. Springer.
Alo´s-Ferrer, C. and Granic´, D.-G. (2012). Two Field Experiments on Approval
Voting in Germany. Social Choice and Welfare, 39(1):171–205.
Alo´s-Ferrer, C. and Granic´, D. G. (2015). Political Space Representation with
Approval Data: the German Experience. Electoral Studies, 39(1):56–71.
Baujard, A. and Igersheim, H. (2010). Framed Field Experiments on Approval
Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections. In Laslier,
J.-F. and Sanver, M. R., editors, Handbook on Approval Voting. Springer.
Brams, S. J. and Fishburn, P. C. (1978). Approval Voting. The American Political
Science Review, 72(3):831–847.
Brams, S. J. and Fishburn, P. C. (2005). Going from Theory to Practice: The
Mixed Success of Approval Voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 25(2):457–474.
De Sinopoli, F., Dutta, B., and Laslier, J. F. (2006). Approval Voting: Three
Examples. International Journal of Game Theory, 35:27–38.
Endriss, U. (2013). Sincerity and Manipulation under Approval Voting. Theory
and Decision, 74(3):335–355.
Fishburn, P. C. (1978a). Axioms for Approval Voting: Direct Proof. Journal of
Economic Theory, 19(1):180–185.
Fishburn, P. C. (1978b). Symmetric and Consistent Aggregation with Dichotomous
Voting. In Laffont, J.-J., editor, Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences.
North-Holland.
Ga¨rdenfors, P. (1976). Manipulation of Social Choice Functions. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 13(2):217–228.
20
Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econo-
metrica, 41(4):587–601.
Kannai, Y. and Peleg, B. (1984). A Note on the Extension of an Order on a Set
to the Power Set. Journal of Economic Theory, 32(1):172–175.
Laslier, J.-F. and Van der Straeten, K. (2008). A Live Experiment on Approval
Voting. Experimental Economics, 11(1):97–105.
Puppe, C. (1995). Freedom of Choice and Rational Decisions. Social Choice and
Welfare, 12(2):137–153.
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975). Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Exis-
tence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare
Functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10(2):187–217.
Sen, A. (1991). Welfare, Preference and Freedom. Journal of Econometrics,
50(1):15–29.
Taylor, A. D. (2005). Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Wolitzky, A. (2009). Fully Sincere Voting. Games and Economic Behavior, 67:720–
735.
21
